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1. Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1. Background and motivation 
 
A need for competitive advantage is increasing the need for changes in 
organisations (Guest, Michie, Conway & Sheehan, 2003). That is one reason 
why human resource management (HRM) research has been a rapidly 
expanding field of study. The HRM performance relationship have been 
approached from various perspectives, with emphasis on the impact of 
combinations of human resource practices on a range of performance 
outcomes at the individual and organisational level of analysis. (Paauwe, 2009) 
One practice for managing human resources is compensation systems, with 
which organisations try to motivate and commit employees to the organisation, 
and try to encourage them to participate and be loyal. Pay systems like 
competence-based pay, and bonuses, as well profit-sharing systems as team-
based pay are only a few methods that have been created for these purposes. 
Compensation is an important issue for the organisation as it has an impact on 
everyone to some degree, and it can be a very valuable and powerful tool in 
managing human capital (Lawler, 1995). An effective performance 
management system should, according to Smither (1998), be a key building 
block of every organisation’s human capital management system. In addition, 
Combs, Lui, Hall and Ketchen (2006) argue that the impact of high 
performance work practices on organisational performance, are not only 
statistically significant, but also managerially relevant. Declining productivity 
in many industries has spurred management to build new creative 
compensation systems in an effort to improve productivity and quality while 
keeping labour costs under control (Welbourne & Gomez-Mejia, 1988). As 
Pfeffer (1994) claims the traditional sources of success, that is product and 
process technology, markets or financial resources, and economies of scale can 
provide competitive leverage, but to a lesser degree than before.  
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Currently it is more vital to manage the organisational culture and 
capabilities deriving from how people are managed. Human resource 
management (HRM) practices can encourage employees to work harder and 
even smarter. For instance Huselid (1995) argues that it is possible to enhance 
employee motivation by using profit- and gain-sharing plans. 
Profit-sharing (PS) has been seen as part of companies’ HRM systems and 
practices (Coyle-Shapiro, Morrow, Richardson & Dunn, 2002; Kaarsemaker & 
Poutsma, 2006), and therefore an important tool for managing employees. The 
term ‘profit-sharing’ (referred to as PS in the following text) generally refers to 
employee incentive plans (decided by company management) that are tied to a 
company’s profitability (i.e. PS is usually based on formulas that measure the 
company’s overall financial performance). The purpose of PS plans is not only 
to benefit the firms that use them as part of their HRM, but also to create 
benefits for the employees (e.g. Perotin & Robinson, 2003).  
As Poole and Jenkins (1990) point out, PS is a multifaceted phenomenon that 
simultaneously aims to improve the economic position of the company, 
improve the relationship between management and employees and thus 
enhance the workplace climate, and improve the motivation of the workforce. 
Because impacts are not automatic the aim in this dissertation is to provide 
new insights into what conditions PS systems are likely to work best. There is 
also a lack of midrange theories that would enhance the understanding of the 
mechanisms through which pay systems could be improved (Heneman, 2000). 
Heneman (2000), among others argue that more research is needed on this 
topic. What are the intervening variables and constructs that help to explain 
the link between HRM practices and performance of the firm? This is why the 
impact of pay knowledge on performance outcomes was selected for this thesis. 
Organisational performance in this study means both attitudinal outcomes, 
that is, pay satisfaction and employee commitment, and organisational 
outcomes, that is, impacts on organisational productivity and profitability. 
This thesis studies a country specific PS plan used in Finland called personnel 
funds. I will explain in more detail how personnel funds function in Chapter 
3.1. 
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1.2. Aims and research questions 
 
The main objective of this thesis is to identify and understand how pay 
knowledge affects company outcomes in companies using personnel funds that 
can be broadly defined as PS plans. Even though there have been many studies, 
the body of literature is not unanimous about the effects of PS systems 
(Armstrong & Stevens, 2005; Cable & Wilson, 1989; Heneman & Judge, 2000; 
Jones & Kato, 1995; Kato & Morishima, 2002; Poole & Jenkins, 1990), and the 
empirical findings concerning the effects of PS systems have been mixed (e.g., 
Kruse & Blasi, 1997). What characterises recent PS discussion is the 
acknowledgement that the positive outcomes do not emerge automatically, and 
much has still to be learned about the reasons and conditions under which PS 
alters, for instance, employee attitudes (Bayo-Moriones & Larraza-Kintana, 
2009). 
I argue that knowledge of the pay system is essential to increase the effects 
companies can achieve by using a PS scheme. Consequently this thesis aims to 
form empirical evidence for my argument. The effects of pay knowledge on 
company outcomes have been understudied. There is to the best of my 
knowledge only one study made in the US (reported in Heneman, Mulvey, 
LeBlanc, 2002; Mulvey, LeBlanc, Heneman & McInerney, 2002) which has 
studied perceived pay knowledge. The aim is to also study knowledge and its 
impact on company outcomes, which has not been studied before. 
The research context of the thesis is Finnish personnel fund (PF) schemes 
used in several Finnish companies. In order to achieve the above mentioned 
objective, the research is broken down into sublevel objectives. The first is to 
investigate the impact of pay knowledge on pay satisfaction and perceived 
outcomes (i.e. economic performance and perceived workplace climate and co-
operation). The second is to examine the antecedents of pay knowledge, and 
how pay knowledge is related to PS satisfaction and organisational 
commitment. The third is to look at a case company in a longitudinal context, 
and ascertain if increased pay knowledge leads to enhanced attitudes and 
effects. The fourth is to look at the performance impact of PF schemes, and to 
explore if the subjective and objective performance measures are comparable, 
and to compare if there are differences between two respondent groups 
regarding subjective and objective performance measures.  
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This thesis consists of four individual research papers, and a preface. The 
preface, especially Chapter 4 addresses the main objectives of this thesis. Each 
article answers one of the following research questions: 
 
RQ 1. What is the relationship between pay knowledge, pay satisfaction and 
pay effectiveness? (Article 1) 
RQ 2. What are the antecedents and consequences of pay knowledge?  
(Article 2) 
RQ 3. Does increased pay knowledge lead to enhanced attitudes and effects? 
(Article 3) 
RQ 4. Are there differences between respondent groups regarding the 
relationship between subjective and objective performance impact measures? 
(Article 4) 
As the thesis is based on four limited studies and published research papers, 
the analysis in this thesis is limited to the topics and issues reported in these 
research papers.  
The four original articles are presented in Appendices I-IV. 
 
2. Context and theoretical background 
 
 
 
2.1. The purpose of profit-sharing plans 
 
During the last couple of decades, management scholars and practitioners have 
been introduced to organisational arrangements characterised as ‘employee 
involvement’, ‘participative management’, ‘democratic management’, and ‘total 
quality management’ according to Lawler, Mohrman, and Ledford (1995). The 
success of these arrangements is premised on the assumption that making 
management systems more participative and when making the employees 
owners in their organisation that can have favourable effects on employee 
attitudes and views about the company, as well as enhance firm performance 
(cf., Pendleton, 2009; Pierce & Rodgers, 2004).  
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One way to create employee participation is to involve them in the financial 
success of the business: to engage them in a profit-sharing (PS) system. The 
literature on PS acknowledges different PS plans. Jackson, Mauldin, Wilcox, 
and Kruse (2004), among others, note that those plans can be cash-based or 
deferred. A cash-based PS plan (CPS) is one where profit is paid to the 
employees in cash, whereas the deferred PS plan (DPS) is one where profit is 
released only after a certain time: usually several years (see for example 
Fakhfakh & Perotin, 2000; Lawler, 1989). 
As mentioned earlier PS is part of companies’ HRM systems and practices 
(Coyle-Shapiro et al., 2002; Kaarsemaker & Poutsma, 2006). The term PS 
generally refers to employee incentive plans (decided by company 
management) that are tied to a company’s profitability (i.e., PS is usually based 
on formulas that measure the company’s overall financial performance). In 
other words, PS plans are a way of rewarding employee contributions when 
targets are reached (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; LeBlanc, 1994). However, the 
purpose of the plans is not only to benefit the firms that use them (i.e., to 
improve the firms’ economic position), but also to create benefits for the 
employees (e.g., Perotin & Robinson, 2003). These benefits can be both 
economic and psychological. As Poole and Jenkins (1990) point out, PS is a 
multifaceted phenomenon that also aims at creating a better workplace climate 
(e.g., by improving the relationship between management and employees) and 
enforcing employee motivation (e.g., Klein, 1988; Klein & Hall, 1989). 
It has been observed that much of the research evidence on PS systems is 
based on the American experience (D’Art & Turner, 2004). This is not 
surprising given that PS is popular in the United States. However, according to 
Kalmi, Pendleton, and Poutsma (2005), it has also increased in popularity in 
Europe since the early 1990s1. In fact, financial participation schemes 
(including PS and employee share ownership) are quite common in Europe, 
although there still are several countries without such schemes and some are 
still planning to adopt them2. Therefore, focusing more efforts on investigating 
a European PS scheme and its effects is justified. The next section will explain 
how the Finnish PS system works.  
 
 
1 This is at least in part due to the promotion of financial participation schemes in the 
European Union at the Lisbon summit in 2000. 
2 See e.g. Lowitzsch and Woodward (Eds) 2009, and Pendleton, Poutsma, van 
Ommeren, & Brewster, 2001. 
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2.2. The personnel fund system a Finnish profit-sharing system 
 
The Finnish PFs were formed in the late 1980s and the PF law was enacted at 
the beginning of 1990. The whole idea of PFs was inspired by US employee 
stock ownership plans (ESOPs) and Swedish wage-earner funds. There are 
important differences between these schemes. Neither ESOPs nor wage-earner 
funds (WEFs) are PS schemes; in the former, the trust acquires the shares 
using borrowed capital, whereas the latter were sponsored by the Swedish 
government by the taxation of profits3. A PF typically distributes its 
shareholdings quite widely and invests also in other securities; employee share 
ownership plans invest only in their own firm. The main difference between 
PFs and wage-earner funds is that the former are completely voluntary and 
operate at the firm level, whereas the latter operated at the national level for 
the benefit of the entire workforce. The targets and motivations behind the 
funds have been to share the success of an enterprise, increase co-operation 
and employee commitment and motivation. 
Personnel funds are deferred PS plans, allowing investment into the equity of 
the company and thus involve an element of employee share ownership.4 They 
are company level agreements even though there is a law giving the framework 
for the action, that is, they are regulated by the 1989 Personnel Funds Act5. The 
capital paid to the fund is mainly (at least up to 50 %) accumulated from 
company profitability indicators from the income statement. It is possible to 
also use other measures of efficiency, for instance, quality or physical 
productivity, but at the time of this survey companies did not, however, use 
this opportunity. The employer retains the right to choose the criteria of profit-
related payments, but it must be fixed before the realisation of income 
statements, typically a year in advance. Payments are made once a year. 
Personnel funds are established by a collective decision of the employees. It is 
required that 2/3 of all personnel groups support the establishment of the 
fund. This rule, in particular, is why I argue that PFs are more participative 
than other bonus schemes. The law on PFs requires that all employees are 
included in the plan; only senior management may be excluded. A company 
must have at least 30 employees in order to set up a PF of this kind, while, in 
the case of corporate groups, there can also be joint funds for all the member 
3 See Blasi and Kruse (1991) for a description on ESOPs and Whyman (2004) for a 
recent account on WEFs. 
4 The discussion draws from Sweins (2004) and Vartiainen and Sweins (2002).  
5
 The latest amendment was enacted 1.1.2011. 
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companies. A PF registered with the Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
has a legal personality in its own right. However, it may engage only in those 
activities referred to in the PFs Act. The funds invest their capital either in 
shares of the own company or other companies, in investment funds, bonds or 
in bank accounts. Through these investments, the financial gains of the 
employees extend beyond just profit-shares6. 
The capital in the PF is divided into individual accounts and sometimes a 
collective part, which is used either for administrative costs or other costs of 
the fund. The shares are distributed to employees typically either in relation to 
compensation (base pay or total compensation) or in relation to hours worked. 
Equal shares are also used to some extent. The individual shares of the 
members are vested for the first five years of membership7. After that, a 
member can withdraw at most 15 % of the value of his or her accumulated fund 
share. When the employee retires, he or she is able to withdraw the value of the 
fund share, either immediately or in parts, within four years,  According to the 
law, the fund, at the very least, must inform each employee about his or her 
share at least once a year by  letter. In practice this was the only information 
that the employees had about the fund during the year in the majority of PF 
companies. From the employees' standpoint the fund is a deferred-payment 
scheme, which tends to foster their commitment to the company from which 
profit-related payments originate. 
Altogether 87 funds were established between 1990 - 2009, of which 30 have 
been closed down mainly due to mergers and divestments. The majority of the 
funds were established in the beginning of the 1990s. After the recession in the 
middle of the 1990s only a few funds were established each year. In 2000, 
when the empirical material for this study was collected, there were 36 funds 
with 80,500 members. However, in more recent years the popularity of the 
funds has increased. For instance in 2005 there were 8 new funds registered, 
which is more than in any other year since 1991. In November 2009 there are 
57 PFs with more than 136.000 members covering more than 5 % of the whole 
workforce. There are several tax advantages for PFs. For the employees, 20 % 
of the pay-outs from the fund are tax-free. The fund pays no taxes on its 
earnings. Employers do not have to pay pension nor social security 
contributions for the profit-shares paid to the fund. 
6 When the fund invests the assets in the company the fund can be defined as an ESOP, 
and when the assets are invested outside the company it is a PS scheme. In practice 
many of the companies invest part of the assets in the company and the rest in other 
assets. 
7
 Since 1.1.2011 the shares are not vested any longer. 
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Share ownership plans can, according to Pendleton (2009) take a number of 
different forms or combinations. Governments might encourage these plans by 
allowing some or all of these awards to be exempted from income tax (Corby, 
Palmer & Lindop, 2009). The Finnish PFs are closely related to the French 
“Participation” – model of deferred PS, and the UK Approved PS Schemes, 
which is an employee share scheme financed from company profits.8 However 
in the French scheme the PS criteria is fixed by legislation and the scheme is 
mandatory for companies with over 50 employees, and in these respects it 
clearly differs from the Finnish scheme. Moreover, in the UK scheme, the 
employee trust invests in the shares of the sponsoring company only and after 
the investing period the employee holdings are distributed in shares, unlike the 
Finnish case where the shares are distributed in cash.  So the Finnish PFs 
represent a fairly original model of financial participation. Along with broad-
based stock options (Jones, Kalmi & Mäkinen, 2006), PFs represent the major 
form of financial participation in Finland.9  
The aim, and one of the reasons why companies adopt PS schemes, is to 
enhance workplace co-operation and productivity (i.e. Kruse, 1996). That was 
also the aim in Finland. The reasons behind the establishment of the PFs lie in 
discussions about financial democracy and employee involvement (Vartainen & 
Sweins, 2002). It is believed that giving the employees participation in 
decision-making and financial participation the employees become more 
motivated, more satisfied and more committed. In the next section these issues 
are discussed in more detail. 
 
 
2.3. Theories explaining pay system outcomes  
 
It is important to understand the factors that motivate people and how reward 
processes and practices that enhance motivation, commitment, job 
engagement and positive discretionary behaviour can be developed (Armstrong 
& Stephens, 2005). If the employees are not motivated it will limit the 
effectiveness of even highly skilled employees. 
 
8 See Pendleton and Poutsma (2004) and Poutsma (2001) for a more detailed 
discussion on these schemes. 
9 By financial participation I refer to the forms of compensation where part of the 
employees’ total compensation depends on measures of profitability and performance, 
such as PS, employee share ownership and stock options. See Poutsma (2001) for 
further discussion.  
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Motivation theories explain why people behave in a certain way at work in 
terms of efforts, discretionary behaviour and the directions they take 
(Armstrong & Stephens, 2005). What is the role of rewards and incentives in 
motivation? If people think the rewards are worth having and attainable, the 
reward can act as a motivator. Incentives are designed to encourage people to 
reach objectives. Incentives are intended to provide direct motivation, that is, if 
you do this you will get an incentive. There are a number of motivation theories 
which describe in more detail the process of motivation. For instance, there are 
five main theoretical frameworks that address the relationship between money 
and performance (Jenkins, Gupta, Mitra & Shaw, 1998). These are expectancy 
theory, reinforcement theory, goal setting theory, cognitive evaluation theory 
and equity theory. I have chosen to use expectancy theory in my thesis, because 
it is the core process theory according to Armstrong and Stephens (2005). I 
will not discuss the different motivation theories as such. My aim is to describe 
the importance of knowledge in the light of the expectancy theory in the next 
section. 
 
2.3.1. The importance of knowledge in light of the expectancy theory 
 
“Expectancy theory has been widely used over the past three decades in 
attempting to understand and predict the motivational and behavioural 
consequences of pay” (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003, 123) The argument that 
knowledge of pay systems has an impact on organisational outcomes can be 
understood in terms of the expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964). The expectancy 
theory suggests that tying financial incentives to performance increases 
extrinsic motivation to expend effort and consequently performance (Vroom, 
1964). This theory argues that pay systems motivate employees to improve 
their performance only when they understand the relationship between their 
effort and realised performance. Employees should also understand the 
relationship between the performance levels they achieve and the 
compensation they receive. They should also place a high value on 
compensation. The perception between the performance levels and 
compensation requires knowledge of the specific contents of the PS system. 
Knowledge and information sharing about how and why pay systems operate 
and how they are connected to the business results and employee performance 
are necessary for motivational effects to occur (Mulvey et al., 2002). Without 
this knowledge, the operation of the system is bound to appear fairly 
unpredictable to employees and therefore not motivating. 
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2.3.2. Line of sight  
 
Boswell (2006, p. 1489) defined ‘line of sight’ as “…an employee’s 
understanding of an organisation’s objectives and how to contribute to those 
objectives.” ‘Line of sight’ is often used in the literature to describe how 
individuals see the link between two concepts as in the compensations 
literature, that is, Lawler et al., (1995) discusses the link between performance 
and rewards. The work of Boswell (2006), among others, suggests that it is 
important for employees to understand the company objectives and how to 
contribute to them. Boswell and Boudreau (2001) argue that communication, 
incentives, involvement, leadership styles, open-book management and cross-
training help build this understanding. 
The expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964) has dealt with the ’line-of-sight’ 
problems. According to the theory, first, the employees must understand the 
relationships between their efforts and performance levels in order to develop 
expectations and, consequently, for the pay system to be effective. Second, 
from the instrumentality perspective, the employees also have to understand 
the relationship between the performance levels they achieve and the 
compensations they receive. Finally, concerning valence, the employees must 
consider compensation as a positive value. Mulvey et al., (2002) argue that 
expectancy, instrumentality, and valence are greatly improved and clarified 
when knowledge and information are shared openly and effectively. Their 
findings indicate that employees consider financial rewards more valuable in 
organisations where they understand the pay process. In these organisations 
employees are also more satisfied and committed. The basic idea of how to 
avoid the ’line-of-sight’ problem is very simple: the employees must know how 
the pay system works (c.f. Lawler, 1981).  
“Line of sight is conceptually distinct by focusing on strategic objectives 
(rather than value systems), yet line of sight to an organisation’s strategic 
objective maybe likely to promote a feeling of “fit” with the organisation as 
employees have greater sense of awareness of the organisation’s direction and 
goals and those actions of greatest importance” (Boswell, 2006, p.1492) 
According to Boswell (2006), it is important to align the employees so that 
there will be a ‘fit’ between HRM practices and the organisational objectives. If 
the employees have an accurate understanding of these objectives and they 
know how to contribute, it is more likely that the employees’ behaviour will 
align with the organisations’ needs and interests. She further argues that ‘line 
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of sight’ is related to the contingency theory. Most importantly, Boswell and 
Boudreau (2001) argue in their ‘line of sight’ model that ‘line of sight’ leads to 
improved employee attitudes, such as job satisfaction, commitment and 
improved organisational outcomes. 
The next section looks at the impacts of PS systems on performance. 
 
 
2.4. Profit-sharing systems and their impact on performance 
 
By impact on performance I mean both the impact on employee attitudes and 
the impact on organisational performance. In the following sections I will first 
look at what has been discovered about the role of pay knowledge, 
communication and information sharing. Next I will discuss the impact PS has 
on employee behaviour, that is, on pay satisfaction and organisational 
commitment. Then I will have a look at psychological ownership, which is a 
psychological phenomenon often related to financial participation schemes. 
Finally, I will examine the impact of pay systems on organisational 
performance and briefly describe two different ways of measuring 
organisational performance. 
 
2.4.1. The role of pay Knowledge 
 
One of the key elements which have been identified as affecting the success of 
the reward system is personnel knowledge of the pay system. Low awareness 
and poor understanding about compensation can according to Mulvey et al., 
(2002) cause pay dissatisfaction, which in turn may lead to low commitment, 
or even worse turnover. Pay can have significant effects on employee 
behaviour. If the employee has knowledge and insight of the pay system it will 
effect his or her motivation; performance, satisfaction, and the pay will thus, 
have more meaning for the employee (Thierry, 1998). Mulvey et al., (2002) and 
Heneman et al., (2002) have recently suggested that pay knowledge may be an 
important determinant of pay satisfaction and organisational efficiency. In 
their model, pay knowledge improves pay satisfaction, which in turn improves 
organisational performance. In their model, pay satisfaction thus mediates the 
effects of pay knowledge into better organisational performance. Pay 
knowledge may actually according to Heneman et al., (2002) be a more 
important determinant of pay satisfaction than the amount of pay. Improved 
pay knowledge is found to be related to higher levels of organisational 
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effectiveness than just additional pay (Mulvey et al., 2002). They argue further 
that a well -functioning pay system can make it easier for the individuals to 
think and to do the right things by making more clear and supportive goals and 
priorities for both the organisation and the individual, and at the same time 
maintain external competitiveness and internal equity. Knowledge of pay is 
also important so that the employees have a clearer vision of the organisational 
goals. Similar results have been found by other researchers (i.e. Martin & Lee, 
1992), who find that knowledge of the pay structure when hired was among the 
most important predictors of perceived pay fairness and pay satisfaction. 
Dulebohn and Martocchio (1998) indicate that understanding the pay plan is, 
particularly, important for the perceptions of procedural and distributive 
justice when using work group incentive pay plans. Hence, there is a need to 
develop more theory to specify the most important interacting variables, so it is 
possible to evaluate under what circumstances variable pay plans are likely to 
be effective according to Miceli and Heneman (2000).  
There is a rich literature on the determinants of the effectiveness of financial 
participation plans (e.g. Bakan et al., 2004; Klein 1987; Klein and Hall 1988; 
Long 2000), but few researchers have considered the impact of the knowledge 
of plan characteristics. Even though the influential frameworks of Long (1978) 
and Pierce et al., (1991) considered a rich set of potential variables that are 
related to the effectiveness of employee share ownership plans, including 
measures of employee involvement and information sharing on company 
performance, knowledge about plan characteristics was not addressed. Klein 
(1987) and Klein and Hall (1988) stress that that employees are most satisfied 
when the company is making large contributions to the ESOP. They also 
included a measure of how management communicates about the employee 
stock ownership plan to the employees, and find that extensive 
communications enhance employee satisfaction with the plan. Long (2000) 
considers communication on PS plans as one of his independent variables 
when examining the determinants of well-functioning PS schemes. He finds 
that communication on PS improves the outcomes. Hale and Bailey (1998) find 
that shareholder returns were higher in companies where employees were well-
acquainted with their reward systems. Kauhanen and Piekkola (2006) find that 
the motivational effects of performance-related-pay are higher the better 
employees know the measures used in rewarding. A group incentive plan based 
on performance measures that are in the employee’s sight and control is 
according to LeBlanc (1994) fair and motivating. 
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Communication and information sharing 
Information sharing with employees regarding the ESOP may also be an 
important source of leverage for enhancing performance (Pierce et al., 1991) 
the extent of communication regarding the ESOP is one important ownership 
attribute. In four studies out of five reviewed by Brown and Armstrong (1999), 
communication is in some way related to the success of the team-based reward 
plan. The nature of the communication may be important; formal and informal 
communication may vary in form and fairness perceptions may be affected if 
there is no proper information provided (Miceli & Lane, 1991). If the company 
shares no information about the likelihood of increases (or chance to make a 
profit) then the employees will be unable to accurately assess the likelihood 
that increases will be received (Miceli & Lane, 1991). The communication 
system also helps to develop trust in management, that is, respondents that 
know more about the pay system are more engaged in their work and have 
greater trust which is needed to make the pay system work (Brown & 
Armstrong, 1999; Heneman et al., 2002; Milgrom & Roberts, 1995). Bollinger 
and Smith (2001) make a clear distinction between information and 
knowledge. Information is according to them processed data and it is available 
to everyone, for instance, through computers. They define knowledge as “the 
understanding, awareness, or familiarity acquired through study, investigation, 
observation or experiences over the course of time” (p. 9). 
Earlier research has stressed the role of communication and information on 
performance-based pay. For instance Lawler (1981) argues that employees 
should have information of how the pay system works in order to understand 
the pay system. The effectiveness of PS systems may be questioned according 
to Lawler et al., (1995) for two reasons. First, they claim that the ‘line of sight’ 
for PS is often quite poor, individual employees may not know how to affect the 
distant measures of profit. Second, employee’s lack of information and 
knowledge about the business which exists in many organisations limits the 
“line of sight” even more. If there is no information and knowledge, variable 
rewards often emerge as random and unpredictable (Lawler et al., 1995). 
Brown and Armstrong (1999) argue that information for employees even if it is 
face-to-face information is not enough to involve or engage them in the 
process. The employer does not get trust or commitment if the employees do 
not see the bigger picture that is, understand the business. The next section 
deals with attitudinal impacts. 
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2.4.2. Attitudinal impacts 
 
Pay Satisfaction 
Heneman, Porter, Greenberger and Strasser (1997) argue that pay satisfaction 
is one important measure of organisational effectiveness. Organisations with 
satisfied employees tend to be more effective than organisations with less 
satisfied employees (Ostroff, 1992). Satisfaction with rewards can influence 
overall job satisfaction, as well as absenteeism, recruitment and turnover 
(Lawler, 1981). In addition, it is argued that employees are more satisfied when 
they see strong linkages between pay and performance, even if they receive no 
rewards (Miceli & Lane, 1991). One of the issues affecting employee pay 
satisfaction is the feeling of justice. In a review of several studies (Miceli & 
Lane, 1991) it is suggested that distributive justice has a strong relationship 
with perceptions of pay satisfaction Employees who believe that their pay plan 
effectively rewards their work group’s performance had higher justice 
perceptions than those who did not (Dulebohn & Martocchio, 1998).  
Currall, Towler, Judge and Kohn (2005) indicate that an identification of 
variables that mediate the effects of pay satisfaction on organisational 
outcomes is a fruitful area of future research. Is there a relationship between 
employee satisfaction and financial performance? There are mixed answers to 
this question (e.g. Bernhardt, Donthu & Kennett, 2000). For instance Wiley 
(1991), found a non existent relationship between overall employee satisfaction 
and financial performance. Currall et al., (2005) and Ostroff (1992) consider 
that one important issue for future research is to identify variables that 
mediate the effects of pay satisfaction and organisational outcomes. Profits are 
a result of several factors including satisfaction (Bernhardt et al., 2000). There 
is evidence that pay dissatisfaction is related to reduced levels of performance 
and it may have an undesirable impact on employee outcomes. (Currall et al., 
2005; Heneman & Judge, 2000). Satisfaction with the PS plan has also been 
found to have a positive effect on organisational commitment (Buchko, 1993; 
Coyle-Shapiro et al., 2002; Florkowski & Schuster, 1992; Miceli & Mulvey, 
2000). 
 
Commitment 
Employee commitment can be influenced through the adoption of HRM 
practices such as PS (Coyle-Shapiro et al., 2002). There is empirical evidence 
that employee ownership schemes and PS schemes enhance organisational 
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commitment (Buchko, 1993; Florkowski & Schuster, 1992; Klein, 1987; Klein & 
Hall, 1988). 
Earlier research on organisational commitment has mainly used one 
commitment construct, affective or emotional commitment (Allen & Meyer, 
1990; Culpepper, Gamble & Blubaugh, 2004). According to Allen and Meyer 
(1990), strongly committed employees identify themselves with the 
organisation, are involved in the organisation and enjoy their membership in 
the organisation. The hypothesis that financial participation leads to higher 
organisational commitment has been at the centre of financial participation 
research since at least the research of Long (1978). The findings of Klein (1987) 
and Klein and Hall (1988) emphasise the mediating role of satisfaction with the 
employee ownership plan in increasing commitment to the firm and the 
motivation to work there. It has also been suggested that organisational 
commitment increases performance (Coyle-Shapiro et al., 2002; Poole & 
Jenkins, 1990). The following section discusses the psychological phenomenon 
called psychological ownership. 
 
Psychological ownership 
Some researchers (e.g. Dirks, Cummings & Pierce, 1996; Pierce, Driscoll & 
Coghlan, 2004; Pierce, Kostova & Dirks, 2001; Pierce & Rodgers, 2004) argue 
that there is a psychological phenomenon called psychological ownership. The 
employees can under certain conditions develop feelings of ownership towards 
the organisation and various organisational factors (Pierce, Kostova & Dirks, 
2001). Pierce et al., (2001) argue that the core of psychological ownership is the 
feeling of possessiveness and of being psychologically tied to an objective. The 
construct of psychological ownership is conceptually distinct from 
organisational commitment, identification, and internalisation, because it 
describes a unique aspect of the human experience in organisations, according 
to Pierce et al. (2001). Pierce et al., (2004) make the following distinction 
between psychological ownership and commitment: psychological ownership 
answers the question “how much do I feel this is mine?” and organisational 
commitment (Meyer & Allen, 1991) answers the question “should I maintain 
my membership in this organisation and why?” 
Pierce and Rodgers (2004, 588) suggest that employee ownership can be 
“thought of as a dual creation - part an objective and part psychological state”. 
This means that ownership can be real or partly in the mind. Pierce and 
Rodgers (2004) argue that psychological ownership, the individual’s ownership 
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stake in the organisation, partly derives from investments of the self (i.e. 
working hours, tenure etc) in the organisation.  They further claim that “the 
influence and information dimensions contribute to experiences of control over 
the target and intimate knowing of the target” (p.599), and thus there is a 
potential connection between formal and psychological ownership. 
The next section deals with the impact of PS schemes on performance. 
 
2.4.3. Impacts on organisational performance 
 
The productivity effects of employee financial participation schemes including 
PS schemes have been the subject of an extensive literature, but it still remains 
a controversial issue (that is, Kalmi et al, 2005; Kato & Morishima, 2002; 
Perotin & Robinson, 2003). According to Robinson and Wilson (2006) there is 
still a way to go before we understand the full extent of the relationship 
between financial participation schemes (includes both PS and employee 
ownership) and productivity. Financial participation has both positive and 
negative effects, but the relative effect cannot be predicted precisely by the 
theory (Ben-Ner & Jones, 1995). The traditional rationale for financial 
participation schemes is that they align worker and employer objectives in 
maximising output (Bryson & Freeman, 2010) Mitchell, Lewin, and Lawler, 
(1990) argue that deferred PS plans can even in large corporations achieve two 
things: first paying for performance has some potential symbolic and 
communications value. It is an effective way to point out to the employees that 
they are part of the organisation and that co-operative effort is needed. Second, 
some companies seem to use PS plans to educate the employees about the 
financial conditions of the business, so that they become more aware of what 
profits mean for the firm and how they are calculated. Thus PS can increase 
both motivation and employee interest in learning about profits and thereby 
organisational effectiveness (Mitchell et al., 1990; Rousseau & Spherling, 
2003). In addition, Corby et al., (2009) argue that share plans contribute to 
increased productivity, competitiveness, and profitability through enhanced 
employee loyalty and commitment and thus, when PS schemes are introduced 
both company profitability and worker productivity are seen as likely to be 
improved (Poole & Jenkins, 1990). 
According to Freeman, Kruse and Blasi (2010), the outcome of shared 
capitalism (including PS and employee share ownership) that receives most 
attention is productivity. The belief is that when one ties workers’ pay to 
workplace performance it is expected to induce workers to increase effort, 
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commitment, willingness to share information, and to decrease turnover and 
absenteeism. Jenkins et al., (1998) made a meta-analytic review about the 
impact of financial incentives to performance and found that financial 
incentives are related to performance quantity. They found no relationship to 
performance quality, but the study included only six studies and should then be 
viewed with caution. 
Some researchers have some doubts regarding productivity effects, they 
argue that the collective nature of the incentive is generating “free riding” 
behaviour on the part of the workers’, because the benefits resulting from one 
employee’s effort are shared with others (see e.g. Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). 
Other researchers, for example, Ben-Ner and Jones (1995) counters these 
claims by arguing that financial participation schemes encourage peer 
monitoring, which in turn reduces the “free-rider” problem.  
To sum up, the results on earlier studies have been mixed, and thus more 
research is needed on this topic. The next section goes through different ways 
of measuring organisational performance.  
 
2.4.4. Different ways of measuring organisational performance 
 
Objective performance measures 
Economists, in particular, have been concerned with the micro economic 
effects of PS, and above all with the consequences on company performance 
(Poole & Jenkins, 1990). Many studies have pointed to a relationship between 
PS and share-ownership schemes and the economic and financial performance 
of organisations.  
Economists usually measure performance with objective measures gathered 
from financial statements. Studies assessing the productivity impact of 
financial participation schemes usually use measures of output (typically value 
added or sales) and regress them on inputs (capital and labour) and augment 
the standard specification by including a measure for a financial participation 
scheme (usually a dummy variable). The most common specification in the 
literature is the Cobb-Douglas production function, although constant elasticity 
of substitution (CES) and translog functions are also used. Some studies use 
labour productivity which is the ratio of output to the number of employees, as 
the dependent variable. Studies that are able to use panel data, and where there 
are adoptions of financial participation schemes during the observation period, 
can control for unobserved heterogeneity by including the firm-level fixed 
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effects in their estimations10. The estimated effect of the adoption of a shared 
compensation practice is around 3-9 % increase in productivity (that is,, Cable 
& Wilson, 1989; Jones & Kato, 1995; Kato & Morishima, 2002)11. 
Positive results have also been found in studies assessing profitability effects 
with measures, such as ROI (return on investment), ROA (return on assets) 
(Mitchell et al., 1990), ROC (return on capital) (Fitzroy & Kraft, 1986) and net 
profit (Magnan & St-Onge, 2005). Mitchell et al., (1990) found that profit-
sharing is positively related to ROI, ROA, and productivity for both clerical 
workers and production workers. Fitzroy and Kraft (1986) found, strong effects 
of profit-sharing on ROC using simultaneous WLS-Tobit estimates. In 
addition, Magnan and St-Onge (2005) found in their pre-post design, that 
firms adopting PS enhance their profitability in comparison to their own prior 
performance and to firms not adopting PS. 
 
Subjective performance measures 
There is much less literature studying the effects of financial participation 
schemes at the organisational level using subjective measures of performance.12 
There are two alternative approaches. The first one uses a performance 
measure where the respondents are asked to rate the productivity of their 
company relative to the competitors. This is then used as the dependent 
variable and is regressed on the financial participation indicator. This method 
is suitable for samples that include both firms with financial participation 
schemes and for firms without such schemes. Blanchflower and Oswald (1988) 
and Bryson and Freeman (2010) use this method, both being based on the 
British Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS). Neither of these 
studies finds any pronounced links between PS and productivity. The second 
type of studies, which is suitable for samples having no comparison firms 
without financial participation schemes, have direct questions on the 
performance effects of financial participation schemes. Such studies include  
10 Some key studies include Cable and Wilson 1989; Conyon and Freeman 2004; 
Fakhfakh and Perotin 2000; Fitzroy and Kraft 1987; Jones and Kato 1995; Kato and 
Morishima 2002; Kruse 1993; Robinson and Wilson 2006; Wadhwani and Wall 1990.  
11 The productivity effects of performance-based pay are also tested with Finnish data, 
with results that are similar to those obtained internationally (see Kauhanen & 
Piekkola, 2002; Uusitalo, 2002). 
12 However, there is a significant literature, beginning with Long (1978) studying the 
effects of financial participation schemes at the individual level using subjective 
measures. 
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Kalmi et al., (2005), Long (2000), Poole and Jenkins (1990), and Sweins, 
Kalmi, Hulkko-Nyman, (2009). These studies often indicate relatively strong 
links between financial participation and productivity.  
 
Studies comparing objective and subjective performance measures 
Productivity studies has rarely linked employee reports on how ownership 
plans actually influence company output, partly because the surveys lack the 
quantitative output data necessary for such a productivity analysis (Kruse, 
Freeman, Blasi, Buchele, Scharf, Rodgers & Mackin, 2003). There are a few 
recent studies comparing subjective and objective measures of overall 
workplace performance. These studies include Forth and McNabb, (2008), 
Guest et al., (2003), Haskel, (2005), Kersley, Alpin, Forth, Bryson, Bewley, Dix 
& Oxenbridge, (2006) and, Wall, Michie, Patterson, Wood, Sheehan, Glegg & 
West, (2004). However, none of these included PS systems. The research is 
dominated by data gathered from the WERS where the subjective measures are 
ordinal measures of performance and or productivity taken from HR managers 
which relate the performance/productivity of the respondent’s workplace to 
the average for the industry on a five-point scale. Wall et al., (2004) used a 
similar measure of WERS on subjective performance by asking the respondents 
to rate the performance relative to the main competitors. Of these studies only 
Guest et al., (2003) and Forth and McNabb (2008) clearly distinguish between 
subjective productivity and profitability measures. The objective measures 
used in these studies are different accounting measures (i.e. gross/ mean 
output per worker, gross/mean value added per worker) mainly gathered from 
Annual Business Inquiry (ABI) and/or Financial Performance Questionnaire 
(FPQ). 
As Wall et al., (2004) and Forth and McNabb (2008) argue, the expectation 
is that subjective and objective measures should give consistent results, that is 
there should be a high correlation between the two types of measure. However, 
the results from the literature are somewhat mixed. Guest et al., (2003) find a 
small positive correlation (0.06) between the objective and subjective measures 
of productivity, and a larger correlation (0.33) between the objective and 
subjective measures of profitability. Wall et al., (2004) find that the estimated 
correlations between the subjective and objective performance measures are 
not particularly high. Haskel (2005) finds no significant relationship between 
self-reported productivity data and ABI productivity data, even when using a 
wide variety of ABI productivity measures. Kersley et al., (2006) find the 
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correlations between the subjective and objective measures to be positive, but 
not very strong. Forth and McNabb (2008) argue that subjective and objective 
measures are weakly equivalent, but differences are also evident. To sum up, 
the literature tends to find evidence that there is a positive correlation, 
although mostly a rather weak one. 
Unfortunately, subjective measures might have distinct disadvantages. The 
respondents may overstate the performance. For instance, in WERS a large 
majority of the respondents claim to have above average performance while 
only a few companies maintain it is below average (e.g. Bryson & Freeman, 
2010). Sometimes the respondents may overstate the impact, if they have a 
stake in continuing the practice. For instance, employees value a compensation 
scheme that generates them extra compensation, and thus they may be inclined 
to overstate its effects in a survey, at least if they perceive that the survey 
results are used in management decision-making. Subjective performance 
variables might suffer from the ‘common method variance’ problem (Spector, 
2006), which means that individuals may tend to give similar ratings to items 
asked by the same method, such as a survey questionnaire. Subjective 
measures are often limited because of their ordinal nature, and thus direct 
quantification of the impact is not possible (Forth & McNabb, 2008). 
Subjective performance measures are often gathered cross-sectionally, and the 
lack of longitudinal data hinders the assessment of causality. 
Moreover, subjective measures may contain errors due to the respondents 
have only limited information on the performance variables. Studies that rely 
only on information provided by the management may suffer from single 
respondent bias (Gerhart, Wright, McMahan & Snell, 2000). In essence, if 
there are idiosyncratic differences among the performance raters that are 
random, having more respondents for each observation reduces the 
measurement error. However, if the differences among the raters are not 
random but systematic, then the situation is different. If group A provides 
poorer quality ratings than group B, then even if including the responses from 
group A may reduce random error, the increase in systematic error may 
outweigh these benefits. In other words, if information is gathered from a 
broader group of employees the risk of having misinformed respondents is 
increased. Moreover, it is likely that employees get their information on 
performance mostly from managers rather than through their own data 
collection effort, which also suggests that including the responses of lower-rank 
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employees may not increase the informational content of performance 
measures.  
However, even if subjective performance measures suffer from a number of 
problems, a divergence between subjective and objective measures does not 
always mean that objective measures are more correct, because objective 
measures suffer from problems of its own. Also in financial statements there 
may be mis-measurement. For instance, when the statements are used for 
taxation purposes, companies try to minimise the tax burden, and this might 
skew the income statements. Sometimes the bias may arise from differing 
accounting standards (Machin & Stewart, 1990). Moreover, because the impact 
is assessed indirectly, any conclusions about causality depend on the model 
being correctly specified (i.e. not suffering from omitted variables bias). For 
instance, if companies using profit-sharing are systematically better than their 
comparison companies in some dimension (for instance, better managed), then 
the performance difference that is attributed to PS may in fact reflect other, 
unmeasured characteristics of management. These comments of course also 
apply to subjective performance measures, unless causality can be directly 
inferred from the questions. 
Finally, it is possible that the divergence in the correlation between subjective 
and objective measures indicates that these two types of measure are not 
identical as assumed, but reflect different underlying concepts (Forth & 
McNabb, 2008). Bommer, Johnson, Rich, Podsakoff and Mac Kenzie (1995) 
criticise objective measures for being excessively narrow.  
Notwithstanding these concerns, subjective performance measures have a 
number of significant advantages according to Forth and McNabb (2008). 
First, when objective measures are not available (at least at the level of 
establishment) or they are commercially sensitive. Second, subjective measures 
are less costly to collect, because there are no requirements to provide a 
detailed financial breakdown, and third subjective measures may attract high 
response rates. 
To sum up, studies comparing PS firms with non- PS firms have usually 
found that PS ones perform better (Mitchell et al., 1990). Both company 
profitability and worker productivity are seen according to Poole and Jenkins 
(1990) to be likely to improve following the introduction of PS schemes. 
According to Poole and Jenkins (1990) there are contradictory findings on 
whether, financial participation schemes increase profitability or not. They 
argue that the inconsistency in the findings is not surprising, because there 
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might be events outside the employees’ control that affects profitability. 
External events, for example, the market price on the final product, may 
enhance or reduce the profits within a company, regardless of the efforts of the 
employees.  
The following section makes a brief explanation of the focus of this study. 
 
 
2.5. The focus of this study 
 
As former studies have revealed (that is, Combs et al., 2006; Coyle-Shapiro, 
2002; Heneman et al., 2002; Ostroff, 1992; Poole & Jenkins, 1990) there seems 
to be a connection between PS and employee attitudes and organisational 
performance, but the mechanisms as to how the incentives enhance these 
issues is still unclear. One unexplored area is the impact of pay knowledge on 
employee attitudes and organisational performance. Thus, our aim in the first 
article was to explore the impact of PS knowledge on pay satisfaction and 
perceived economic performance, and perceived effects on workplace climate 
and co-operation. This was justified as one of the reasons why companies adopt 
PS schemes is to enhance workplace co-operation and productivity (i.e. Kruse, 
1996). As mentioned earlier, recent research has found that knowledge of pay 
(Mulvey et al., 2002, Heneman et al., 2002) is an important factor related to 
pay satisfaction and productivity. The knowledge of pay study measured only 
perceived pay knowledge, therefore the aim of the first article was in addition 
to examine actual pay knowledge. In the subsequent articles we chose to use 
only actual knowledge as a measure for pay knowledge, based on the results 
from this first article. 
As the analysis in the first article was made on the organisational level, and 
thus, there were restrictions as to how many independent variables could be 
included in the analysis, we decided to investigate the impacts of pay 
knowledge more closely on the individual level. The aim of the second article 
was to examine the antecedents of pay knowledge, as we found that there was 
only one study that had done this before (i.e. Klein, Schulte & Carberry, 2007). 
Furthermore the aim was to investigate the relationship between PS knowledge 
and pay satisfaction, as well as pay knowledge and affective commitment.  
The grounds for the third article were that many studies are concerned, and 
point out that more research should be made under longitudinal conditions 
(i.e. Lawler & McDermott, 2003). In addition, there is a need to use case 
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studies to deepen the understanding of the important relationships of financial 
participation with other selected topics (Poutsma, 2001). Thus, the intention of 
the third article was to cover the topics explored in the two first articles under 
longitudinal conditions in one case organisation. 
As the results of earlier studies have been mixed on productivity effects, the 
next step which seemed to be important was to study the productivity effects of 
the PS system (i.e. Poole & Jenkins, 1990). In the fourth article we compared 
organisations with a PF with organisations without PFs. Moreover, as we found 
no studies comparing the subjective and objective impacts of PS and thus, we 
wanted to make a comparison between these measures. In addition, we found 
it interesting to compare the two respondent groups we had, of which one was 
more knowledgeable (or at least they were supposed to be more 
knowledgeable) with the PS system than the other. Thus, we could explore if 
there are differences between the two informant groups.  
To sum up, the analyses in the four different articles are made from different 
angles. First, data is analysed on different levels, on the organisational and 
individual levels. Second, we studied the phenomenon’s both in cross sectional 
and in longitudinal conditions. Third, we compare the performance impacts in 
organisations with PFs with performance impacts in organisations that do not 
have PFs.  
The next section summarises and describes the different datasets used in the 
four articles. 
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3. Data and methods 
 
 
First, I will explain how the main dataset, which is the core of all articles, was 
gathered. Next, I will explain in more detail how the data was used in each 
article, and what additional data was gathered. More details of the sum 
variables used in each article can be found in the four separate articles.  
 
 
3.1. Research data 
 
The main data used in the four articles were gathered during a project I 
participated in at Helsinki University of Technology during 2000-2001. The 
data was gathered from all 36 operating PFs and the organisations behind 
them. Documents were collected from PFs and firms themselves and from the 
Ministry of Labour and the Statistical Centre of Finland. The data consists of a 
personnel questionnaire (n=1038) from 31 companies from which I have used 
only part of the variables available. Five companies did not want to participate 
in the questionnaire survey, because they had ongoing large surveys in the 
company or they had decided (due to mergers), not to pay any profit into the 
fund. The 31 companies represented 86 % of all firms with PFs in 2000. 
The procedure for the questionnaire was as follows: the questionnaire was 
tested in one company before it was finalised. Some minor changes were then 
made. Before posting the questionnaires to the companies, we interviewed the 
management and the chairman of the fund in each company. This was made 
especially, in order to be able to build the tailor-made part that is, measuring 
actual knowledge of pay in each company. The questionnaires were distributed 
to only some employees in each company to save the cost in time caused to the 
participating companies. The number of questionnaires distributed depended 
on the size of the company, and it ranged from 7 to 300. The mean of 
distributed questionnaires in each company was 34. The companies were asked 
to distribute the questionnaires so that the employees who received them 
would represent all employee groups. The questionnaires were returned in 
sealed envelopes. The response rates in the companies (calculated as the 
number of respondents per questionnaires distributed) varied from 15 % to 100 
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%, the mean response rate being 59% that is, 1,038 individual responses were 
received out of 1,956 questionnaires sent. The companies represented different 
sectors from all parts of Finland and the size of the companies varied from 85 
to 12,544 employees. In addition, interview evidence was used regarding 
communications issues from 64 interviews with management and chairmen of 
the funds performed in 2000. In article 4, we used also a shorter questionnaire, 
especially tailored to the chairmen of the funds.  
As the third article is a longitudinal case study, we used supplementary data 
which was gathered in 200513. At that point the company wanted to evaluate 
their total pay system, and there was a chance to renew the questionnaire from 
2000. In addition, we used interviews made in 2000 and 2005 in this article. 
In the fourth article, we used the above mentioned employee questionnaires 
from 2000, and a separate questionnaire made for the chairmen of the funds 
(n=15) using the items measuring subjective assessments of PF effects. The 
objective data was gathered from a database called Voitto + provided by 
Suomen Asiakastieto, which covered 1999-2003. This data was collected for 21 
companies, because representative comparison companies could not be found 
for the others, for example the national airline company, insurance companies 
and banks. 
 
 
3.2. Research design and data analyses  
 
In article 1, the key explanatory variable was PF knowledge. This was measured 
in two ways: First with multiple choice questions (actual knowledge) and 
second with self-reports (perceived knowledge). A list of the items used can be 
found in Appendix 1. Actual knowledge was measured by the firm level mean of 
correct responses. Perceived knowledge was measured by two items at the 
general and firm levels. Concerning these two variables we calculated the firm-
level means of respondents that were confident they knew the relevant 
principles.  One company from the analysis had to be dropped, since there were 
no accumulated profit-shares in this company and, hence, some questions on 
PF knowledge were not asked. This left a sample of 30 companies. 
For the other items used in the questionnaire we used factor analysis with  
13The first data from 2000 was a part of the data explained above that is, one company 
out of 31.  
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Varimax rotation, which resulted in a three-factor solution; 1. Perceived effects 
of the PF system, and 2. Perceived effects on workplace climate and co-
operation, and 3. Satisfaction with the PF system. The factor analysis for these 
items can be found in Appendix 2. As independent variables we used financial 
stake and membership size. All measures are explained in more detail in article 
1. 
The data was aggregated to firm-level and correlation analysis for all 
variables were made. Sector, investment in the company, and plan age were 
used as control variables. The next step was to conduct regression analyses. 
In article 2, the same items were used for actual knowledge, and the 
perceived effects as explained above. Affective commitment was measured 
using three items. The factor analysis of the commitment items used can be 
found in Appendix 2, section 4. Communication of fund related matters was 
measured using one item, ‘We discuss fund related matters often enough’. 
Feedback on performance was measured using one item, ‘I get enough 
feedback on the development of performance measures’. Some observations 
had to be removed from the sample, because of observations that had missing 
values in variables used in regressions. This left a sample of 753 observations. 
The data was analysed on the individual level, so that it was possible to use 
several individual characters as control variables. As dependent variables we 
used single items for communication, feedback, membership length, and the 
sum variables for actual PF knowledge, PF satisfaction and commitment. The 
control variables used were monthly pay, tenure, supervision position, female, 
secondary degree, higher degree, and firm dummies. First a correlation 
analysis was carried out and then three regression analyses to investigate the 
determinants of PF knowledge. 
The third article studies the same issues that were studied in the two first 
articles, now in longitudinal conditions in one case company. The same sum 
variables used in the two first articles were analysed with independent-samples 
T-tests for equality of means, to ascertain if changes were significant between 
the years. In addition, interview data was used to interpret the results of the 
questionnaires. 
In article four, the subjective performance data (the perceived effects of the 
PF system) was gathered from the employee questionnaires in 2000 (n=31). 
For each PF company two comparison companies without a PF were chosen. 
The first criterion was narrow industry classification, and the second was the 
size of the company measured in sales. It was possible to match this data for 21 
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firms of the 31 firms available14. The next step was to calculate the change 
between the 5 years of objective data. We calculated the change in logarithms 
for the two first measures sales, and gross proceeds, but for ROI (return on 
investment), and ROA (return on assets) it was not possible so the change is 
calculated in percentage units. Furthermore, employee questionnaires and, 
chairman questionnaires (n=15) were used to test if there are differences 
between the two informant groups (i.e. employees and chairmen) regarding the 
relationship between subjective performance assessments and objective 
performance measures.  
The next section describes the main results of the four individual articles. 
 
 
 
4. Results of the individual studies 
 
 
4.1. The relationship between pay knowledge, pay satisfaction and 
pay effectiveness  
 
Article 1 examines the impact of pay knowledge on company outcomes, both 
attitudinal and organisational efficiency and answers the first research 
question: What is the relationship between pay knowledge, pay satisfaction and 
pay effectiveness?  
The aim was to ascertain first, if pay knowledge has a positive association 
with PF satisfaction. Second, if there is a relationship between pay knowledge 
and the perceived economic effects. And third, what is the relationship between 
pay knowledge and workplace climate and co-operation? Fourth, does the 
employee’s financial stake in the PF have any relationship with pay satisfaction 
and perceived organisational effectiveness? As the motivational effects of PS 
plans are expected to diminish rapidly when the number of employees 
14 Some of the companies were banks or insurance companies and thus, the financial 
statements could not be compared. 
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increases (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003) we controlled for the relationship between 
membership size. 
As mentioned above we used two measures for PF knowledge in the first 
article, actual knowledge and perceived knowledge. When comparing the 
measures of actual pay knowledge and perceived pay knowledge, we found that 
the measure of actual knowledge is a more powerful predictor of both PF 
satisfaction and perceived organisational effectiveness. Another finding of this 
paper is that pay knowledge has an independent impact on organisational 
outcomes, rather than being mediated through pay satisfaction as for instance 
Mulvey et al., (2002) argued. These findings suggest that the true impact of pay 
knowledge may have been underestimated in previous literature, despite the 
often positive and sizable findings. The results of this article propose further 
that researchers should prefer measures of actual knowledge when they want 
to reliably estimate the relationship between pay knowledge and pay 
effectiveness. 
 
 
4.2. The antecedents and consequences of pay knowledge 
 
Article 2 is a continuation of article 1. As the size of the sample in article 1 was 
limited, that is, how many independent variables we could simultaneously 
include in the regression specifications, we decided to analyse the data on 
individual level so, that some more variables could be used in the analyses.  
For pay knowledge we chose to use only the measure of actual knowledge, 
because the results of the first article found it to be a more precise measure 
than perceived knowledge. The aim of the second article was to answer the 
second research question: What are the antecedents and consequences of pay 
knowledge?  
We started by making a review of the literature, and only one paper was 
found that studied the antecedents of pay knowledge written by Klein et al., 
(2007). Based on this paper and on expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964) we 
decided to test three variables that could be related to pay knowledge that is, 
communication, performance feedback and membership length. The next step 
was to test if PF knowledge is positively related to PF satisfaction and affective 
commitment? We further tested if the effects of PF knowledge are mediated by 
PS satisfaction by utilising the framework of Baron and Kenny (1986).  
 34 
The key results of article 2 reveal that direct communication of fund related 
matters and the length of PF membership enhance PF knowledge. Performance 
feedback is muted in the specification when all explanatory variables were 
included. We further found that there is a positive relationship between PF 
knowledge and PF satisfaction and that the relationship between PF knowledge 
and firm commitment is mediated by PF satisfaction.  
 
 
4.3. Testing if increased pay knowledge leads to enhanced 
attitudes and effects 
 
Article 3 describes how a single company in the manufacturing industry used 
the PF scheme in longitudinal conditions. In addition, it explores how much 
pay knowledge increased over time, and what effects the enhancement of pay 
knowledge has on company outcomes. The aim of the third article is to answer 
research question 3: Does increased pay knowledge lead to enhanced attitudes 
and effects? 
As the case organisation had amended their PF system the assumption was 
that pay knowledge has increased due to this arrangement, and thus pay 
satisfaction and commitment would also be enhanced (i.e. Mulvey et al., 2002). 
The findings of this longitudinal study were that even if pay knowledge had 
increased substantially, pay satisfaction and organisational commitment had 
not increased accordingly. The result might be due to recent disagreements in 
the case organisation about how to calculate the profit being paid to the PF. 
The employees perceived, however, that both economic efficiency and work 
input had increased since the first measurement. The employees perceived 
further that there was enough feedback, but too little communication about 
fund related matters. 
 
 
4.4. Investigating the differences between informants regarding 
subjective and objective performance impact measures 
 
The aim of the fourth article is to answer research question 4: Are there 
differences between informants concerning the relationship between subjective 
and objective performance impact measures? 
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The first aim was to explore if the use of a PF scheme increases performance. 
Second, we wanted to explore if the subjective measures on the impact of the 
PF  indicate beneficial impacts from PF. Third, are the subjective and the 
objective performance measures correlated positively? The fourth and last aim 
was to explore if there are differences between informants when comparing 
these correlations. 
Weak positive support for impacts for increased performance was found in 
companies with a PF, measured by sales growth, gross proceeds, ROI and ROA. 
Both employees and chairmen perceive that the PF has positive impacts on 
company performance. The correlations between subjective and objective 
performance measures differ between the two respondent groups that is, 
employees and chairmen. The result reveals that there is a difference between 
informants. The subjective assessments of chairmen had significant positive 
correlations with the objective performance measures, whereas the 
assessments of less informed employees had negative mostly non significant 
correlations.  
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5. Discussion 
 
 
 
5.1. Summary and contribution 
 
Many studies have been carried out regarding the impact of pay systems on 
both employee attitudes and organisational performance (Bakan et al., 2004; 
Heneman, Porter, Greenberger & Strasser, 1997; Klein, 1987; Long, 1978; 
Ostroff, 1992; Poole & Jenkins, 1990). However, it has still not been clear how 
the outcomes are developed. In this thesis the aim has been to study the impact 
of pay knowledge on employee attitudes and organisational performance in the 
context of Finnish personnel funds. 
When PF knowledge was used in explaining pay satisfaction and perceived PF 
outcomes (performance), surprisingly no evidence was found that the effects 
are mediated through PF satisfaction as, for instance, Mulvey et al., (2002) and 
Heneman et al., (2002) do. On the contrary, the impact of PF knowledge was 
found to be directly connected to performance effects. These findings suggest 
that pay knowledge may have a stronger independent impact on the 
effectiveness of the pay systems than previously believed. Thus, we could 
indicate that a direct link between pay knowledge and pay effectiveness is 
consistent with the expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964), while the gift-exchange 
arguments (Appelbaum & Berg, 2000) would have indicated that the link 
would have been mediated through pay satisfaction. Furthermore, actual 
knowledge was found to be a more reliable measure than perceived knowledge 
in estimating the relationship between pay knowledge and pay effectiveness, 
and thus researchers should prefer measures of actual knowledge. 
Moreover, for enhancing PF knowledge it seems that feedback on financial 
figures is not sufficient information. This was found especially in article 2 
where we found that communication and membership length is more effective 
in increasing PF knowledge than just feedback. The results of the third article 
strengthens this view as pay knowledge had increased substantially in the case 
organisation, and still the employees perceived there were only a small increase 
in perceived performance effects. The employees perceived that they had got 
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more feedback on financial figures, but they did not feel that there were enough 
discussions related to PF matters since the first measurement. The conclusion 
of this result is that the ‘line-of-sight’ (Boswell & Bodreau, 2001) is still quite 
weak among the employees, and that there is a need for more discussions and 
training on the pay system and the role of one’s work. 
The results of article 4 indicate that using objective measures, firms with PFs 
are doing better than firms without PFs. Moreover, it was found that there are 
significant positive correlations between subjective and objective measures, 
when respondents are better informed, whereas in the case of respondents 
being employees at large the correlations are negatives and mostly 
insignificant. This result suggests that drawing subjective assessments from 
uninformed respondents may be a more serious source of bias than single 
respondent bias (see, i.e. Gerhart et al., 2000). 
The findings in this thesis are based on four separate articles. These studies 
have a clear academic novelty in at least four ways. First, the impact of PF 
knowledge is directly connected to performance, and thus pay knowledge may 
have a stronger independent impact on the effectiveness of the pay plans than 
previously believed. Second, researchers should prefer measuring actual 
knowledge before perceived knowledge in order to gain more accurate 
information on the level of pay knowledge. Third, it is important to 
communicate fund related matters; feedback on financial figures is not enough 
when trying to increase knowledge of pay among employees. Fourth, it is better 
to rely on an informed single respondent than on a large pool of less informed 
respondents when making assessments of pay system effectiveness. 
Figure 1 summarises the main findings of the four articles. 
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Figure 1. Summary of the findings  
+ = positive relationship, n.s. = not significant 
 
 
5.2. Practical implications 
 
There still seems to be a need for more information and training for both 
managers and supervisors regarding the PF system, so that they would be able 
to communicate fund related matters easier to the employees. This is 
important because, communication on the PF system was found to increase 
knowledge more than just feedback (article 1). In addition, more discussions 
between supervisors and employees about the pay system, and how one may 
affect the results through work input, are needed in order to strengthen the 
‘line of sight’ of the employees. Frequent information about the PF system is 
also important, if the company wants to use it as a steering mechanism. I argue 
further, that it is important to communicate compensation practices 
systematically not only during the design and implementation process, but also 
during the whole life cycle of the compensation system. It would be preferable 
to give the employees some information about the PF system as early as the 
recruitment stage. 
Moreover, I argue that despite the so-called single respondent bias, it is 
better to use an informed single respondent than a number of less informed 
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respondents. The results of article four indicate that the bias arising from 
gathering data from less informed respondents is more severe than the bias 
when using only a single respondent. This would mean that many surveys on 
the financial impact of pay systems could be done more economically, when 
there would be less need to gather a large number of respondents from 
individual firms. The only problem is, to find the well informed respondents, 
when making a survey15. 
According to the ‘line of sight’ theory (i.e. Boswell, 2006; Boswell & Bodreau, 
2001; Lawler, 1995) the employees should know how they can affect the 
outcomes of the company with their work in order to achieve an effective pay 
system. I argue that knowledge of a pay system is essential to gain positive 
results, but there is also a need for the employees to understand the link 
between their work and the PF system in order to enhance the performance 
outcomes.  
 
 
5.3. Limitations and future research 
 
One potential weakness of article 1 is related to the rather limited number of 
organisations (N = 30) in our sample. It is often unfortunate but in practice 
unavoidable that a large number of observations cannot be obtained when 
doing organisational-level studies. Although there were only a few 
organisations the number of observations is actually the same as for instance in 
Hakonen and Lipponen (2009) study (N = 30). The data in all four articles 
represented the majority of the Finnish personnel funds, which existed in 
2000. The employees had different educations and positions, and represented 
companies in all sectors throughout Finland, and thus I feel confident that the 
data was representative. Nevertheless, it would, of course, be important to 
replicate the results with larger samples before drawing strong conclusions. 
These results can possibly be generalised to other pay systems as well. 
However, it should be remembered that personnel funds are a relatively 
egalitarian system of incentive pay. Therefore, it would be interesting to do a 
comparative study with different types of incentive pay. 
15 I thank Professor Stephen Perkins for pointing this out at the 2nd Reward 
Management Conference in Brussels November 2009, where I presented an earlier 
version of this paper. 
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In article 2 the results should be taken with some caution since the sample 
size may be too small to reliably conduct the full test of mediation, and, 
therefore, there might be an insufficient basis to distinguish between the 
different theoretical arguments. It is also possible, that the test of mediation 
might produce stronger results at the level of individuals than at the 
organisational level. This issue could be further addressed in future research 
Commitment was based on self-reports in the studies. In longitudinal studies 
it would be interesting to analyse employee turnover instead. Another line of 
inquiry could examine the relationship between the perceived fairness of PF 
system and pay satisfaction. Moreover, PF communication was measured in 
the studies with one item. It could be an issue for further research to clarify 
what kind of pay system communication the employees expect or need the 
most. 
In the third article, a case company, which is a representative middle sized 
company using a PF, was examined. We are aware that the sample is quite 
small and this caused some limitations in what quantitative analyses could be 
done. In addition, it could have been valuable to follow up the answers of 
individual members in the questionnaires, but unfortunately there was no 
opportunity to do so. If we had had a bigger sample and followed up each 
member we could have used pair wise t-tests and in addition regression 
analyses. Thus, more exact information could have been acquired on the 
change over time. The interviews could have been conducted the second time 
with semi-structured questions, in order to get more information especially on 
the PF system.  
We did not unfortunately test the knowledge of the chairmen in the fourth 
article. We just supposed they were more knowledgeable based on the 
interviews. Further in the fourth article the findings depend on the assumption 
that the objective measures of impact correspond with the real impact. As 
discussed in the article, there may be various reasons why this may not be 
correct. Unfortunately, we can only test whether the results are similar or not 
when using two types of measures, but not whether one (or both) set of results 
are correct. There is clearly more room for research on these issues, preferably 
overcoming some obstacles we faced. These include small sample size and non-
representative sample, lack of changes in financial participation status 
(precluding fixed effects estimations), lack of information of many variables 
that may influence performance (such as the existence of complementary 
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workplace practices), and the absence of longitudinal data on subjective 
assessments of performance. 
There is clearly room for future research to study pay knowledge and its 
impact organisational performance. This could be best done in a pre-post 
design, and could also be done for pay systems other than PFs. In particular 
there is more work to be done in examining the connection between pay 
knowledge and the employees’ ‘line of sight’. Why is it that even if pay 
knowledge increases the ‘line of sight’ still remains weak? Is it possible to 
strengthen the ‘line of sight’ by more face-to-face information? This could be 
examined by performing an evaluation on employees’ pay knowledge in one 
company. Special efforts should be made to increase the information for the 
employees about the pay system. For instance, part of the employees could be 
provided by written information, and part of the employees could be provided 
with face-to-face information from the supervisors, and some of the employees 
could be left without information. An assessment before, and after these 
actions, would indicate how pay knowledge has developed due to the actions. 
Because HRM processes have been found to be more likely to contribute to 
organisational success when they are introduced as a bundle of practices 
(Michie & Sheehan-Quinn, 2001), it could be interesting to examine how other 
issues in combination with pay knowledge affect the outcomes. For instance 
top managements’ commitment and support for the pay system, because they 
have been found to play a major role behind successful pay systems (Belcher, 
1996; Klein, 1986; Klein & Hall, 1987; Lawler, 1990; Wallace, 1990 in Balkin & 
Montemayor, 2000). 
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5.4. Conclusions 
 
As the above discussion indicates, pay alone does not produce the desired 
attitudinal effects. That is, employees with knowledge, insight and 
understanding of the pay system will be more motivated, satisfied and 
committed as earlier research has also revealed (i.e. Mulvey et al., 2002; 
Thierry, 1998). Motivation arises from the understanding of what needs to be 
done in order to receive the rewards (e.g., Lawler et al., 1995). Commitment 
stems from the PS satisfaction associated with PS knowledge (article 1). The 
key also seems to be in how management follows up the system and not so 
much in the type of plan (c.f. Smith, Lazarus & Kalkstein, 1990). As Boswell 
and Boudreau (2001, p. 856) argue: “….it would seem that supervisor-
subordinate relations have an influence on developing line of sight”.  
The expectancy theory helps us to understand and predict motivational and 
behavioural consequences of pay (i.e. Gerhart & Rynes, 2003). It is not enough 
to know how the pay system works for the pay system to be truly effective. How 
should organisations then communicate pay system issues to the employees in 
the best way? Previous research gives some indications as to how this should be 
done. Face-to-face information seems to be the most successful way for 
internal communication and target information, but it should be combined 
with other communication systems, such as notice boards and emails 
according to Ukko, Karhu and Rantanen (2006). The employees seem to be 
more satisfied if they receive more face-to-face communication, especially from 
upper management and supervisors (Kreps, 1990; Mulvey et al., 2002). 
Communication is important in creating trust in management which is also 
needed for the pay system to work well according to Brown and Armstrong 
(1999). Moreover, we need communication so that the organisational 
objectives and HRM practices would fit with each other. The organisation can 
use the PF system, so that the employees would get more aligned with the 
organisational objectives. When the employees know and understand the 
objectives, and when they know how to contribute, we get an optimal ‘line of 
sight’ as explained by Boswell (2006) for instance. 
One can ask if there is a psychological phenomenon called psychological 
ownership in the context of PFs. Are the employees more satisfied, when they 
get profit shares from a PF even if the PF is not necessarily investing the assets 
in the organisation? Is there a feeling of control over the target? Even if we did 
not investigate the phenomenon as such, we could in the interviews notice, that 
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at least the fund chairmen had a feeling of ownership towards the organisation 
in practically all organisations. This feeling can perhaps, together with a better 
‘line of sight’, be the reason why the subjective impact assessments of chairmen 
were positively correlated with the objective impact measures, whereas the 
subjective impact assessments of employees were not. 
Despite the above mentioned limitations this thesis contributes to the HRM 
literature by giving new insights into the role of pay knowledge on 
organisational performance. The four separate studies suggest that the impact 
of pay knowledge is essential in several ways. First, the results reveal that the 
impact of personnel fund knowledge is directly connected to performance, and 
not mediated through pay satisfaction as earlier research argues. Thus, the 
findings suggest that pay knowledge may have a stronger independent impact 
on the effectiveness of the pay system than previously believed. Second, actual 
knowledge is a more reliable measure than perceived knowledge in estimating 
the relationship between pay knowledge and pay effectiveness, and thus 
researchers should prefer measures of actual knowledge. Third, for enhancing 
knowledge about the personnel fund it is not enough to provide just feedback 
on financial figures. I argue that communication about fund related matters is 
important in order to increase pay knowledge and especially the employees’ 
‘line of sight’. 
The results suggest moreover, that drawing subjective performance 
assessments from uninformed respondents may be a more serious source of 
bias than single respondent bias. This would mean that many surveys on 
financial impacts of the pay system could be done more economically, when 
there would be less need to gather a large number of respondents from 
individual firms. 
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APPENDIX 1     
     
Items measuring personnel fund knowledge      
      
Actual knowledge     
Length of the vesting period     
Maximum annual withdrawal     
Taxation of withdrawals from the fund     
Allocation criteria of fund shares     
Percentage of profit paid to the fund     
Information about fund related matters     
     
Perceived knowledge     
Perceived awareness of general principles of PFs     
Perceived awareness of firm-specific applications     
     
APPENDIX 2     
 Component   
 1 2 3 4 
1. Perceived effects of the PF system      
Quality 0.694 0.013 -0.026 -0.066 
Economic efficiency 0.581 0.031 -0.061 -0.010 
Flexibility 0.690 0.026 -0.161 0.022 
Productive efficiency 0.674 0.021 -0.125 0.004 
Delivery reliability 0.878 0.016 0.024 -0.066 
Customer service 0.827 0.017 0.014 -0.020 
Planning ahead 0.635 -0.003 -0.174 0.030 
     
2. Perceived effects on workplace climate and co-
operation     
Communication 0.035 0.057 -0.585 0.012 
Co-operation at work 0.110 -0.002 -0.779 0.010 
Workplace atmosphere -0.048 0.019 -0.751 -0.133 
     
3. Satisfaction with the PF system,     
I am satisfied with the PF system 0.129 0.041 -0.033 -0.749 
I am satisfied with the yearly acquired bonuses 0.027 0.030 -0.164 -0.690 
     
4. Commitment     
I do not feel emotionally attached to this organisation (rs) -0.016 0.564 -0.062 -0.005 
This organisation means a great deal to me personally 0.064 0.658 0.021 -0.120 
I do not feel a strong sense of belonging in my organisation 
(rs) -0.041 0.798 -0.028 0.040 
     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax 
with Kaiser    
Normalisation. Rotation converged in 3 iterations.     
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